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I. INTRODUCTION*** 
[1] The popularity and growth of online retailing, now in its tenth year, 
has shattered experts’ expectations.  “Online sales in the United States 
grew twenty-four percent last year, to about $90 billion, and online 
retailing now accounts for nearly five percent of all retail sales.”1   
 
[2] This new sales channel brings new advertising opportunities; both 
online retailers and traditional “brick and mortar” establishments2 have 
flocked to the Internet to advertise their goods and services.  In targeting 
Internet consumers, retailers have sponsored individual websites and 
placed virtual billboards, in the form of banner advertisements and pop-
                                                 
* Principal, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia.  B.S., 1994, University 
of Virginia; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law. 
** Associate, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia.  B.A.S., 2000, 
Georgetown University; J.D., 2005, University of Richmond School of Law. 
*** Portions of this Article were presented by Jonathan D. Frieden as a part of a seminar 
entitled “Legal Issues of the Online Retailer – Using Keyword Advertising in Internet 
Marketing” sponsored by Lorman Education Services.  Other portions of this Article 
were published in conjunction with a seminar entitled “Legal Issues of the Online 
Retailer in Virginia,” also through Lorman Education Services. 
1 Leslie Walker, Surf’s Up on Web Shopping, WASH. POST, July 17, 2005, at F1.   In 
2004, nine companies had online sales exceed one billion dollars, with nine more 
exceeding five hundred million dollars in online sales.  Id.  In all, “a total of 75 retailers 
had online sales exceeding $100 million, and 208 had more than $20 million.”  Id.  
Amazon.com alone is expected to have net sales exceeding $8 billion this year. Antone 
Gonsalves, Amazon Sales Up, Profits Down, INTERNETWEEK, July 26, 2005, available at 
http://internetweek.cmp.com/news/166402777. 
2 See Sharon Billington, Relief from Online Used Book Sales During New Book 
Launches, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 497 (2006).    
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ups, throughout cyberspace.  They have used Internet-based 
communications, such as e-mail and instant messaging, to advertise their 
goods and services and have paid particular attention to the way Internet 
users locate the goods and services in which they are interested. 
 
[3] With these new opportunities come new risks as the law strives to keep 
pace with the evolving use of technology for commercial transactions.  
This Article is meant to touch on some of the legal issues attendant to 
online sales and marketing and serve as a resource for online retailers and 
consumers. 
 
II. LIABILITY FOR SENDING UNSOLICITED ELECTRONIC MAIL 
A. THE CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003 
[4] In 2003, Congress passed the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act, otherwise known as the CAN-SPAM Act 
of 2003 (the “Act”),3 which prohibits the distribution of certain unsolicited 
electronic mail, or “spam.”4  The Act imposes both monetary penalties and 
incarceration upon violators5 but does not create a private cause of action 
on the part of the recipient of spam.6  
 
[5] The Act makes it a crime to send unsolicited commercial electronic 
mail containing fraudulent header information and prohibits certain 
methods of generating electronic mail address lists.7  The Act further 
                                                 
3 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7701–7713 (2003). 
4 SPAM, in upper case letters, is spiced pork and ham and is the registered trademark of 
Hormel Foods.  On the other hand, the term “spam” in lower case letters is defined as “an 
unsolicited, often commercial, message transmitted through the Internet as a mass 
mailing to a large number of recipients.”  MICROSOFT ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
1383 (2001).  The term “spam” is believed to derive from a comedy sketch performed by 
the British comedy troupe Monty Python, where a group of Vikings chant the word 
“spam” in a café which serves nothing but SPAM all day.  See Monty Python’s Flying 
Circus, Just the Words, Episode 25 (1970). 
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2003). 
6 Instead, the Act is enforced by a combination of Federal Trade Commission 
proceedings, criminal prosecution, state attorney general actions, and private lawsuits 
brought by internet service providers.  15 U.S.C § 7706(b)–(f) (2003). 
7 Id. § 7704(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2003).  
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prohibits the transmission of commercial electronic mail to recipients who 
have “opted out” of receiving such communications from the sender.8  It 
also creates a regulatory scheme by which certain identifying information 
is required in all commercial electronic mail and “directs the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to develop a plan for implementing a national 
Do-Not-E-Mail registry.”9  The Act is enforced through a combination of 
criminal penalties, authorized civil actions by state authorities, FTC 
action, and civil actions filed by Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).10 
 
1. CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
 
[6] As stated in a recent New England Law Review article, 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act criminalizes certain techniques 
adopted by spammers to evade software filters and to 
conceal their identities.  Specifically, the Act outlaws five 
methods of bypassing anti-spam technology.  First, the Act 
prohibits spammers from hacking into another person’s 
computer, either by a password, or by means of software 
installed on the remote computer via a Trojan Horse, and 
sending spam from the remote computer’s Internet Protocol 
(IP) address.  Second, [the Act makes it a crime] to take 
advantage of an “open" network server for the purpose of 
relaying spam with the intent of deceiving ISP’s or 
recipients as to the origin of the message.  Third, spammers 
may not materially falsify the header information on 
multiple commercial e-mail messages.  Fourth, the statute 
bans the practice of creating multiple e-mail accounts or 
domain names, or using information that materially falsifies 
the identity of the registrant, for the purpose of sending 
multiple unsolicited commercial e-mails.  Finally the Act 
prohibits falsely representing oneself as the authorized user 
                                                 
8 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4). 
9 Adam Hamel, Note, Will the Can-Spam Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on Unsolicited E-
Mail?, 39 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 961, 976 (2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(b), 7708). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (b)–(f) (2003). 
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of a block of IP addresses for the purpose of using those 
addresses for the transmission of spam.11 
 
[7] According to 18 U.S.C. § 1037, distributors of spam may be fined and 
imprisoned for up to five years if the violation was committed in 
“furtherance of a felony,”12 or if the defendant had previously been 
convicted of sending spam either under the Act or any state law.13  A court 
may impose either a fine, imprisonment of up to five years, or both,14 if 
the offense involves:  (1) access to a computer without authorization and 
intentionally sending spam from it; (2) twenty or more falsified e-mail 
accounts; (3) ten or more false domain names; (4) a volume of messages 
exceeding 2,500 during any twenty-four hour period, 25,000 during any 
thirty-day period, or 250,000 during any one-year period; (5) causing loss 
to one or more persons aggregating $5,000 or more during any one-year 
period; or (6) the concerted action of the defendant with three or more 
other persons organized or led by the defendant.15 
 
2. STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTIONS 
 
[8] When a state attorney general or an official of a state agency has 
reason to believe that the residents of his or her state are being harmed or 
threatened by certain violations of the Act, he or she may bring a civil 
action on behalf of those residents.16   
 
Any state authority suing under the Act must first notify the 
FTC . . . and the FTC has a right to intervene in any action 
brought by a state authority.  Also, no state actor may bring 
an action against a defendant named in an action brought 
by the FTC while that [FTC] action is pending.17 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Hamel, supra note 9, at 979–80. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 1037(b)(1)(A) (2003). 
13 Id. § 1037(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2003).  
14 Id. § 1037 (b)(1). 
15 Id. § 1037(b)(2)(A)–(F). 
16 15 U.S.C. § 7606(f)(1) (2003). 
17 Hamel, supra note 9, at 988. 
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3. PRIVATE ACTIONS BY INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
[9] Under the Act, an Internet Service Provider who has been adversely 
affected by violations listed in Section 770418 may bring a civil action 
seeking injunctive relief or damages for either:  (1) the actual monetary 
loss suffered by the provider or (2) statutory damages as set out in the 
Act.19  If the violations of the Act were committed willingly and 
knowingly, or if the violation included harvesting email addresses or the 
automatic creation of electronic mail addresses, the court may treble the 
damages awarded.20 
 
B. VIRGINIA STATE LAW 
 
[10] The Act “supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a state or 
political subdivision of a state that expressly regulates the use or 
transmission of spam, except to the extent that any such state, regulation, 
or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of spam or information 
attached thereto.”21  The Act does not, however, pre-empt state laws that 
are not specific to spam, “including state trespass, contract, or tort law.”22  
Similarly, it does not pre-empt states laws that “relate to acts of fraud or 
computer crimes.”23 
 
[11] For instance, Virginia Code Section 18.2-152.3:1, which prohibits the 
knowing falsification of “electronic mail information or routing 
information” and the sale or other distribution of software intended to 
falsify such information,24 is not pre-empted.  This statute prohibits such 
conduct where  
 
                                                 
18 18 U.S.C. §7704 (2001).  
19 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g) (2003). 
20 Id. § 7706(f)(3)(c). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2003). 
22 Id. § 7707 (b)(2)(A). 
23 Id. § (b)(2)(B).  Virginia has specifically recognized that under certain circumstances, 
the transmission of unsolicited bulk e-mail (i.e., spam) through a computer system can 
constitute the tort of trespass to chattel.  See, e.g. America Online v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 
2d 444, 451–52 (E.D. Va. 1998).  For a good discussion of the effects of and remedies to 
spam, see generally Dianne Plunkett Latham, Spam Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1649 (2001). 
24 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (2004). 
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(1) the volume of mail transmitted exceeds 10,000 
attempted recipients in any twenty-four hour period, 
100,000 attempted recipients in any thirty-day period, or 
1,000,000 attempted recipients in any one-year period, or 
(2) the revenue generated from a specific mail transmission 
exceeds $1,000 or the total revenue generated from all mail 
transmitted to any electronic mail service provider exceeds 
$50,000.25   
 
Violators are guilty of a Class 6 Felony as are those who knowingly hire, 
employ, use, or permit any minor to assist in the transmission of 
unsolicited bulk electronic mail as described in the statute.26 
 
III. KEYWORD ADVERTISING AND POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
A. UTILITY AND METHODS 
 
[12] Early on, online marketers’ focus on the way users of the Internet 
located the goods and services in which they were interested guided 
companies’ choices of domain names, leading some retailers to adopt the 
trademarks of competitors as domain names or use those marks within the 
hidden code generating their websites.27  Now, as Internet users have 
become more sophisticated, online retailers target consumers using the 
same search engines those consumers use to find information on the 
Internet. 
 
1. SEARCH MARKETING 
 
[13] Internet search engines, such as Google and Yahoo assist users in 
locating specific websites by displaying a list of sites that contain search 
terms or keywords entered by the user.  Search engines create this list of 
websites using an algorithm to process and match the user-defined 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Such practices have been forbidden by federal legislation.  See, e.g., Melissa Klipp & 
Michael Zogby, Caveat Venditor:  Using a Competitor Brand to Drive Traffic to Your 
Site, 14 N.J. LAW.:  WKLY. NEWSPAPER, May 16, 2005, at A8. 
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keywords to text on various sites, ordinarily listing links to these websites 
in order of decreasing relevance to the user’s search.28  The order in which 
the listed websites appear takes on particular importance in light of the 
view that “only the top few sites on the . . . [search results page] will be 
visited by [search engine] users.”29  Accordingly, aggressive online 
marketing techniques often focus on increasing the likelihood that a 
specific website will appear near the top of the search results generated. 
 
[14] Online retailers typically use two methods to increase their visibility 
to search engine users:  (1) search engine optimization and (2) keyword 
advertising.30  Search engine optimization involves an analysis of the 
software used by search engines “in order to ‘tweak’ a website so that it 
comes as high up” on a search results page as possible.31   Such 
optimization often includes the use of particular terms in the hidden text of 
the website code32 known as “metatags.”33  Keyword advertising, or 
“keying,” “involves identifying the main keywords people type in when 
searching the Web and ‘buying’ those keywords deemed most likely to 
lead consumers to the [advertiser’s] website.”34   
 
[15] Used properly, search marketing can directly increase the number of 
visitors to, and sales by, a particular website.35  The power of search 
advertising is evidenced by the fact that it has spawned an entirely new 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Special Report – Online: Search and Ye Shall Find, MARKETING WK., Jan. 20, 2005, at 
43. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
[M]arketers can “hijack” users searching for rivals’ brand names in 
various ways.  For example, a website for Company A could hide 
Company B’s brand names or advertising slogans in the underlying 
computer code [for Company A’s website].  While ordinary [Web] 
surfers never see this code, the software the search engines use to 
catalogue the Web do:  so Company A’s site will be deemed to be more 
‘relevant’ [to the surfer’s search] despite actually pushing rival brands. 
Id. 
33 See Terrell W. Mills, Seeking to Evade User Detection and the Lanham Act, 6 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 22, *3 (2000).  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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Internet-based industry whose focus is helping online retailers maximize 
their visibility to consumers who use Internet search engines.36 
 
2. KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
 
[16] Keyword advertising is a growing marketing method for online 
retailers and a growing revenue source for Internet search engines.37  The 
success of keyword advertising, coupled with aggressive marketing 
approaches involving the use of trademarks owned by competing 
businesses, has resulted in a recent flood of litigation testing the 
application of traditional trademark principles to this new form of 
advertising.38  It is imperative that online retailers appreciate not only the 
value of keyword advertising but also the potential legal exposure 
attendant to its use. 
 
[17] The power of keyword advertising as a marketing tool and its position 
as the leading revenue generator among Internet search engines has led to 
a noticeable increase in its use.39  A majority of the most popular Internet 
search engines, including Google and Yahoo, offer this sort of “paid 
placement” advertising program in which advertisers are permitted “to 
purchase search terms, which either trigger the advertiser’s site to appear 
at the top of a [search results page], . . . highlight a link to the site as a 
sponsored or featured ad,” or display the advertiser’s banner 
advertisement.40  As explained in a recent article, “[t]he process is simple: 
advertisers bid on and purchase those search terms that they believe will 
attract the most users to their sites.  Such search terms can be descriptive 
words, product names or, in some instances, the brand names [or 
trademarks] of a competitor.”41 
                                                 
36 Websites such as “http://www.searchenginerankingservice.com” advertise relationships 
with hundreds of thousands of Internet search engines and offer to assist online retailers 
in increasing the visibility of their website.  
37 See Sarah J. Givan, Using Trademarks as Location Tools on the Internet:  Use in 
Commerce?  2005 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 4 (2005).  
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Michelle Kaiser Bray, Search Engine Practices Create Intriguing Legal 
Issues, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., April 26, 2004, at 25 (“According to some analysts, the 
[keyword advertising] . . . business accounts for nearly 75 percent of search engine 
revenue, a figure likely to exceed $2 billion this year [2004].”).  
40 Klipp, supra note 27, at A8. 
41 Id. 
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B. GENERAL TRADEMARK CONCEPTS 
 
1. TRADEMARK LAW 
 
[18] A trademark is  “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . used by a person, or . . . [intended for use in 
commerce] . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, 
even if that source is unknown.”42  As explained by Professor Kurt 
Saunders, “a trademark serves as an indicator of source for consumers, 
allowing them to associate the product with its manufacturer.”43  By 
indicating the source of goods, trademarks also serve as an indicator of 
quality and may serve as an indicator of sponsorship or authorized 
distribution.44 
 
[19] The Lanham Trademark Act provides federal protection for both 
registered and unregistered trademarks,45 with the greatest protection 
being afforded to highly distinctive marks.46  The Lanham Act prohibits 
both infringement and dilution, permitting trademark owners to obtain 
injunctions, and in some cases monetary damages, for the improper use of 
their marks.47 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000). 
43 Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key:  A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword 
Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 546–47 (2002).  
44 Id. 
45 Saunders, supra note 43, at 547 (citations omitted) (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 114 
(2001)). The Lanham Trademark Act provides protection for registered trademarks (15 
U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.) and unregistered trademarks (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).  
However, trademark owners who register their trademarks in accordance with the federal 
statute are afforded additional benefits not provided to the owners of unregistered marks.  
“Federal registration of a trademark creates a presumption of validity, ownership, and the 
right to use the mark, and allows the owner to prevent importation of products into the 
United States that may infringe the mark.” Saunders, supra note 43, at n. 29. 
46 Saunders, supra note 43, at 547–49 (“Trademarks are classified in the order of their 
increasing distinctiveness:  generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful.  The 
more distinctive the mark, the greater protection afforded by law.”).  
47 Id. at 547–48. 
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2. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
[20] Under the Lanham Act, “any person who shall, without the consent of 
the registrant use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or 
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive” can be found liable for trademark infringement.48  
Thus, to prevail on such a claim, a trademark owner must demonstrate 
that:  (1) it has a valid trademark, entitled to protection under the Lanham 
Act; (2) the infringer used the mark; (3) the infringer’s use of the mark 
was in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services; (4) the 
infringer’s use of the mark occurred in commerce; (5) the infringer’s use 
of the mark was likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of the infringer with the trademark owner, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of the infringer’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities by the trademark owner; and (6) the infringer’s use 
of the mark was without the consent of the trademark owner.49  
 
3. UNFAIR COMPETITION 
 
[21] The Lanham Act also affords protection to unregistered trademarks, 
imposing liability for unfair competition where a person  
 
                                                 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).  
49 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).   To establish likelihood of confusion, the trademark 
owner, 
  
must show that there exists a likelihood that an appreciable number of 
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be confused as to the source 
or sponsorship of the goods or services in question.  The test for 
determining likelihood of confusion involves a weighing of factors, 
including the following:  (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the 
degree of similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the 
proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge 
the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting the 
mark; (7) the quality of defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication 
of the buyers. 
Saunders, supra note 43, at 549–50. 
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uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation 
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact which . . . is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person 
without another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another . . . .50   
 
The tests for infringement of registered and unregistered marks are nearly 
identical. 
 
4. TRADEMARK DILUTION 
 
[22] The Lanham Act protects trademarks from dilution, as well as 
infringement.  Dilution “refers to the decreased capacity of a famous mark 
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of competition 
between the parties or likelihood of confusion.”51   
 
Trademark dilution usually takes the form of “blurring” or 
“tarnishment.” Blurring occurs where consumers 
mistakenly associate the famous mark with goods and 
services of another’s mark, thereby weakening the power of 
the famous mark owner to identify and distinguish its 
goods and services. . . . By contrast, tarnishment occurs 
“where an accused, junior mark is used on unwholesome or 
inferior goods or services that may [degrade or] create a 
negative association with the goods or services protected by 
the famous mark.”52  
 
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, the federal 
dilution statute outlines eight factors for courts to use, along with other 
relevant factors: 
                                                 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
51 Saunders, supra note 43, at 550. 
52 Id. (citing THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3:4 (4th ed. 2001)).   
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A. the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of 
the mark; 
B. the duration and extent of use of the mark in 
connection with the goods or services with which 
the mark is used; 
C. the duration and extent of advertising and publicity 
of the mark; 
D. the geographical extent of the trading area in which 
the mark is used; 
E. the channels for trade for the goods or services with 
which the mark is used; 
F. the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading 
areas and channels of trade of the mark’s owner and 
the [adverse party]; 
G. the nature and extent of use of the same or similar 
marks by third parties; and 
H. whether the mark was registered . . .53 
 
C. TRADEMARK ANALYSIS OF KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE SEMINAL CASES 
 
A) PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC. V. NETSCAPE COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION 
 
[23] The earliest case involving keyword advertising adjudicated54 in the 
United States was Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp., decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004.55  The 
defendants in Playboy used various lists of keywords to which they keyed 
advertisers’ Internet banner advertisements. The specific list at issue in the 
case contained a variety of terms related to sex and adult-oriented 
entertainment, including the terms “playboy” and “playmate,” for which 
                                                 
53 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
54 Two of the earliest trademark cases involving keyword advertising were settled without 
adjudication.  See Saunders, supra note 43, at 558 (citing Estee Lauder Inc. v. Fragrance 
Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp., 
105 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). 
55 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (“PEI”) holds trademarks.56   Defendants 
required adult-oriented companies to link their advertisements to this set 
of terms so that when Internet surfers entered certain search terms such as 
“playboy,” or “playmate,” the search results page would display the 
defendants’ banner advertisements.57 
 
On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,  
PEI introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads 
displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often 
graphic in nature and are confusingly labeled or not labeled 
at all.  In addition, the parties do not dispute that buttons on 
the banner ads say “click here.”  When a searcher complies, 
the search results page disappears, and the searcher finds 
him or herself at the advertiser’s website.58   
 
Moreover, PEI introduced uncontroverted evidence that defendants used 
“click rate” statistics, measuring the “ratio between the number of times 
searchers click on banner ads and the number of times the ads are 
shown”59 to persuade paying advertisers to renew their keyword 
advertising contracts.60  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants.61 
 
[24] On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed both PEI’s trademark 
infringement and dilution claims.  As to the infringement claim, the court 
noted that PEI’s strongest argument for likelihood of confusion was for a 
specific type of confusion known as “initial interest confusion.”62  As 
explained by the court, “[i]nitial interest confusion is customer confusion 
that creates initial interest in a competitor’s product.  Although dispelled 
before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly 
capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore 
actionable trademark infringement.”63 
                                                 
56 Id. at 1023. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1024. 
63 Id. at 1025. 
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[25] The court noted that “the ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ 
the likelihood of confusion,” was central to the determination of whether 
the defendants had infringed PEI’s trademarks.64  In applying the Ninth 
Circuit’s eight-factor test originally described in AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats 
to determine likelihood of confusion,65 the court explained that, in the 
Internet context, “courts must be flexible in applying the factors, as some 
may not apply” and specifically recognized “that some factors are more 
important than others.”66 
 
[26] In reviewing the record in light of the Sleekcraft factors, the court 
determined that factors one, two, three, four, six, seven, and eight favored 
PEI’s position,67 and factor five was “equivocal” but merited “little 
weight.”68  Accordingly, the court determined that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to the substantial likelihood of confusion and 
denied summary judgment on the “fair use” defense asserted by the 
defendants.69 
 
[27] In examining PEI’s dilution claim, the court found that PEI had 
established a genuine issue of material fact as to each disputed 
requirement of its claim:  (1) the famousness of the subject marks; (2) the 
commercial use of the marks by defendants; and (3) the dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the marks.70  Accordingly, the circuit court reversed 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1024 (noting that no dispute existed “regarding the other requirements set forth 
by the statute:  PEI clearly holds the marks in question and defendants used the marks in 
commerce without PEI’s permission”). 
65 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).  The eight factors 
are:  (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) 
evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the 
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting 
the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.  Id. 
66 Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1026 (“For example, a showing of actual confusion 
among significant numbers of consumers provides strong support for the likelihood of 
confusion.”). 
67 Id. at 1026–29. 
68 Id. at 1028. 
69 Id. at 1029.  In separate analyses, the court also denied defendants summary judgment 
on their nominative use and functional use defenses.  Id. at 1029–31. 
70 Id. at 1031–33.  The trial court rendered its decision before the Supreme Court clarified 
the standard for withstanding summary judgment on dilution claims in Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
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the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings.71 
 
B) THE EARLY WHENU.COM  CASES 
 
[28] Though not directly involving keyword advertising programs, 
reported opinions pertaining to WhenU.com, Inc.’s Internet “pop-up” 
advertising program formed the basis for many later keyword advertising 
decisions.  Three WhenU.com cases are worthy of note, with the first two 
being decided before a series of Google keyword advertising decisions 
that have helped to refine the analysis of these issues.72 
 
(1) WELLS FARGO & COMPANY. V. WHENU.COM, INC. 
 
[29] In Wells Fargo & Company v. WhenU.com, Inc., the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the online 
“contextual marketing”73 program of WhenU.com, Inc. (“WhenU”) in the 
context of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging trademark infringement and 
its motion for preliminary injunction.74  WhenU delivers its online 
“contextual marketing” to computers via “SaveNow,” its proprietary 
software product.75  SaveNow delivers “contextually relevant advertising 
at the moment the consumer demonstrates an interest in the product or 
service, without any knowledge of the consumer’s past history or personal 
characteristics” based on the consumer’s Internet browsing activity.76  
Relevant advertisements are then delivered directly to the consumer’s 
computer screen, or “desktop.”77 
 
                                                 
71 Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1034. 
72 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-
Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003); 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).  
73 Wells Fargo & Co.,  293 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (“Contextual marketing technology 
endeavors to market products and services to consumers who have a demonstrable 
interest in those products and services . . . .  Traditionally, contextual marketing has been 
conducted by assembling large databases containing a wide variety of personal 
information about individual potential customers and their past purchasing behavior.”).  
74 Id. at 736. 
75 Id. at 738. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
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[30] WhenU sells its advertising on the basis of “sales categories, which 
are grouped into certain product and service categories.”78  The 
Advertising Operations team at WhenU receives a creative copy of an 
advertisement from an advertiser, then “maps” the advertisement “by 
determining the various categories . . . and keyword algorithms that will 
trigger the appearance of the advertisement, subject to priority and 
frequency limitations.”79  The data is then recorded in the WhenU 
Directory (the “Directory”), which is delivered to and saved on a 
participating consumer’s desktop.80 
 
[31] As provided in the court’s decisions, 
 
As a participating consumer browses the Internet, the 
SaveNow software studies the user’s browsing activity and 
compares it against the elements contained in the Directory.  
Simultaneously, the SaveNow software determines 
whether:  (a) any of those elements are associated with a 
category in the Directory, and (b) whether those categories 
are associated with particular advertisements.  If the 
software finds a match, it identifies the associated product 
or service category, determines whether appropriate ads are 
available to be displayed, and, if so, selects an ad based on 
the system’s priority rules, subject to internal frequency 
limitations.81 
 
[32] The advertisements displayed by SaveNow are displayed in 
“conspicuously branded” windows, specifically indicating that they are 
provided by WhenU and are not sponsored by any website the Internet 
user may be seeing.82  The advertisements do not display any trademarks 
other than those owned by WhenU or the advertiser.83  Web addresses and 
search terms are included in the Directory but are used only as an indicator 
of consumer interest.84 
                                                 
78 Id. at 744. 
79 Id. at 743. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 745. 
83 Id. at 746–48. 
84 Id. at 743. 
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[33] After a review of the specific evidence presented in the case, the 
Wells Fargo court determined that WhenU had made no “use” of the 
plaintiff’s trademarks under the Lanham Act.85  In particular, the court 
noted that  
 
WhenU does not use any of plaintiffs’ trademarks to 
identify goods or services, to indicate any sponsorship or 
affiliation with the goods or services advertised by WhenU, 
or to identify the source or origin of any goods or services 
advertised by WhenU.86 
 
[34] The court also found that plaintiffs had failed to submit competent 
evidence of likelihood of confusion from the SaveNow advertisements, 
stating that there was “good reason to believe that the typical SaveNow 
user would not perceive a WhenU advertisement as sponsored or affiliated 
with the plaintiffs’ websites.”87  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
noted that:  (1) participating consumers are “accustomed to receiving 
offers from WhenU while surfing the Web”; (2) the advertisements 
produced by SaveNow are conspicuously labeled as originating from 
WhenU, with a disclaimer that they are not sponsored or affiliated with the 
website being viewed by the consumer; and (3) SaveNow advertisements 
appear in a separate window, “bear all of the indicia of a distinct software 
application, and do not relate in any way to any other window on the 
user’s screen.”88 
 
(2) U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. WHENU.COM, INC. 
 
[35] In the fall of 2003, around the same time as the Wells Fargo decision, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was 
deciding U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.89  In ruling on 
                                                 
85 Id. at 769. 
86 Id. at 747 (“The use of keyword terms in connection with the delivery of 
advertisements is a common practice on the Internet, and is a source of revenue for search 
engines such as Google, and other Internet companies.”). 
87 Id.  at 749. 
88 Id. at 749–50. 
89 U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).  
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cross motions for summary judgment, the U-Haul court reviewed the same 
SaveNow software at issue in Wells Fargo.90 
 
[36] The court granted summary judgment for WhenU, holding that 
SaveNow made no impermissible “use” of plaintiff’s trademarks.91  In 
particular, the U-Haul court pointed out that 
 
“use” is not established merely because trademarks are 
simultaneously visible to a consumer.  Such comparative 
advertising does not violate trademark law, even when the 
advertising makes use of a competitor’s trademark. . . .  
Thus, the appearance of WhenU’s ads on a user’s computer 
screen at the same time as the U-Haul web page is a result 
of how applications operate in the Windows environment 
and does not consist of “use” pursuant to the Lanham Act.92 
 
The court further found that WhenU’s inclusion of the U-Haul web 
address and trademark “U-Haul” in the Directory did not constitute “use in 
commerce” under the Lanham Act because neither the web address nor the 
trademark were displayed to consumers, but were only used internally, by 
the SaveNow software.93 
 
C) THE GOOGLE CASES 
 
[37] The success and visibility of Google’s keyword advertising program 
has made it a recent target of trademark litigation in various courts around 
the world.  The United States cases involving Google help shed some light 
on the current state of trademark law as it is applied to keyword 
advertising. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Id. at 724–25. 
91 Id. at 729. 
92 Id. at 728 (citations omitted). 
93 Id. at 727. 
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(1) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY V. GOOGLE, INC. 
 
[38] In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.,94  
Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) filed an eight-
count complaint against defendants Google and Overture alleging 
trademark infringement, contributory trademark infringement, vicarious 
trademark infringement, false representation, and dilution under the 
Lanham Act95 based upon the “defendants’ use of GEICO trademarks in 
selling [keyword] advertising on defendants’ Internet search engines.”96  
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)97 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting, among other arguments, that 
the defendants’ use of the GEICO trademarks did not occur “in 
commerce” or “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, 
or advertising of goods and services.”98 
 
[39] In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court first outlined the 
elements of trademark and unfair competition claims before reviewing the 
authorities cited by each party.99  Among other authorities, defendants 
cited to U-Haul to support their proposition that their use of the GEICO 
trademarks was not a “trademark use of those marks under the Lanham 
Act.”100  In opposing the motion to dismiss, GEICO focused on cases 
reaching the opposite conclusion, such as Playboy and the district court 
opinion in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com,101 and directed the court to 
                                                 
94 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
95 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). 
96 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.,330 F. Supp. 2d at 701.  
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
98 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
99 Id. (“A plaintiff alleging causes of action for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition must show 1) that it possesses a mark; 2) that the defendant used the mark; 
3) that the defendant’s use of the mark occurred ‘in commerce’; 4) that the defendant 
used the mark ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising’ 
of goods and services; and 5) that the defendant used the mark in a manner likely to 
confuse customers.”). 
100 Id. at 703. 
101 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d 
414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); see also infra § III(C)(1)(d). 
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decisions holding that the use of trademarks in metatags “constitute a use 
in commerce under the Lanham Act.”102 
 
[40] The court viewed the authorities cited by GEICO as better reasoned 
and denied the motion to dismiss as to GEICO’s federal claims, stating 
that 
 
[t]he complaint clearly alleges that defendants use 
plaintiff’s trademarks to sell advertising, and then link that 
advertising to results of searches.  Those links appear to the 
user as “sponsored links.”  Thus, a fair reading of the 
complaint reveals that plaintiff alleges that defendants have 
unlawfully used its trademarks by allowing advertisers to 
bid on the trademarks and pay defendants to be linked to 
the trademarks.103 
  
The court further noted that, 
 
defendants’ offer of plaintiff’s trademarks for use in 
advertising could falsely identify a business relationship or 
licensing agreement between defendants and the trademark 
holder.  In other words, when defendants sell the rights to 
link advertising to plaintiff’s trademarks, defendants are 
using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may imply 
that defendants have permission from the trademark holder 
to do so.  This is a critical distinction from the U-Haul case, 
because in that case the only “trademark use” alleged was 
the use of the trademark in the pop-up software – the 
internal computer coding.  WhenU allowed advertisers to 
bid on broad categories of terms that included the 
trademarks, but did not market the protected marks 
themselves as keywords to which advertisers could directly 
purchase rights.104 
                                                 
102 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.330 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (citing Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 
2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Aisia Focus Int’l, No. Civ.A. 97-734-A, 
1998 WL 724000 (E. D. Va. 1998)).  
103 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.330 F. Supp. 2d at 703–04. 
104 Id. at 704.  
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[41] Based on this analysis, the court held that GEICO had “sufficiently 
alleged that defendants used its marks ‘in commerce.’”105  The court 
further rejected Google’s argument for the dismissal of the contributory 
and vicarious trademark infringement claims, holding that GEICO had 
properly alleged that “the advertisers made ‘use in commerce’ of the 
trademarks by using marks as source identifiers in the advertising links 
posted on Google’s search results page.”106 
 
(2) GOOGLE, INC. V. AMERICAN BLIND & WALLPAPER FACTORY, INC. 
 
[42] The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California heard a similar case in Google, Inc. v. American Blind & 
Wallpaper Factory, Inc.107  Like GEICO, American Blind & Wallpaper 
involved trademark claims based upon allegations that Google “sold to 
American Blind’s competitors keywords comprised, in whole or part, of 
American Blind [trademarks] . . . .”108  Like GEICO, the reported opinion 
in American Blind & Wallpaper addressed a motion to dismiss filed by the 
defendant “on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege an 
actionable trademark ‘use.’”109 
 
[43] After reviewing the relevant case law, including U-Haul, Wells 
Fargo, and Playboy, the court noted that the state of the law in this area 
was “uncertain” and that, under the fairly liberal standard applicable to 
motions to dismiss, the court must permit the plaintiff to proceed on its 
claims.110  Though the court referenced the liberal standard applicable to 
motions to dismiss, it was clearly persuaded by the opinion in Playboy.111 
 
D) 1-800 CONTACTS, INC. V. WHENU.COM, INC. 
 
[44] In June 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.  The court 
                                                 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 705.  
107 Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340JF, 2005 WL 
832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). 
108 Id. at *2. 
109 Id. at *4. 
110 Id. at *4–5. 
111 Id. at *5–6. 
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reviewed the district court’s granting of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 
injunction against WhenU for the same conduct described in Wells Fargo 
and U-Haul.112 
 
[45] Plaintiff alleged that WhenU infringed plaintiff’s trademarks “by 
delivering advertisements to Internet users who intentionally accessed the 
plaintiff’s website.”113  Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the 
plaintiff had “demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its 
trademark infringement claims.”114  WhenU appealed the district court 
decision.115 
 
[46] Once again, the central issue in the court’s determination became 
whether WhenU “used” the 1-800 Contacts trademarks within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act.116  After reviewing the Lanham Act’s 
definition of “use in commerce,” the court reviewed the previous two 
WhenU.com decisions, which it found to be “persuasive and 
compelling.”117 
 
[47] In stating that WhenU was not “using” the 1-800 Contacts trademarks 
in the manner ordinarily associated with an infringement claim, the court 
noted that “WhenU does not reproduce or display [the] trademarks at all, 
nor does it cause the trademarks to be displayed to a [user].  Rather, 
WhenU reproduces 1-800’s website address, www.1800contacts.com, 
                                                 
112 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The 
specific conduct at issue in this case has been described in detail by the district court”).  
The district court decision can be found at 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 
F. Supp. 2d 467, 476–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  As previously discussed, other courts have 
also addressed similar claims against WhenU.  See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738–40, 743–46 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725–36 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
113 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 405. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 406. 
116 Id. 
117 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407–08.  The court noted with disapproval that “the 
district court’s consideration of these two comprehensive decisions on the precise issue at 
hand was confined to a footnote in which it cited the cases, summarized their holdings in 
parentheticals, and concluded, without discussion, that it ‘disagree[d] with, and [was] not 
bound by these findings.’”  Id. at 408.  
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which is similar, but not identical, to [the plaintiff’s] 1-800 Contacts 
trademark.”118  Though the district court found the differences between 1-
800 Contacts’ website address and trademark to be insignificant, the 
appellate court came to the opposite conclusion, holding that the addition 
of “www.” and “.com” to the 1-800 Contacts trademark “transform[ed] 
[the] trademark—which is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act—
into a word combination that functions more or less like a public key to 1-
800’s website.”119 
 
[48] The court further contrasted WhenU’s conduct with the conduct at 
issue in GEICO, noting that “WhenU does not disclose the proprietary 
contents of the SaveNow directory to its advertising clients nor does it 
permit these clients to request or purchase specified keywords to add to 
the directory.”120  Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s 
granting of a preliminary injunction, holding that 
 
[a] company’s internal utilization of a trademark in a way 
that does not communicate it to the public is analogous to 
an individual’s private thoughts about a trademark.  Such 
conduct simply does not violate the Lanham Act, which is 
concerned with the use of trademarks in connection with 
the sale of goods or services in a manner likely to lead to 
consumer confusion as to the source of such goods or 
services.121 
 
E) RECENT CASES 
 
(1) MERCK & CO., INC. V. MEDIPLAN HEALTH CONSULTING, INC.; & EDINA 
REALTY, INC. V. THEMLSONLINE, INC. 
 
[49] On March 30, 2006, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York handed down a decision in Merck & Co. Inc. v. 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 408–09. 
120 Id. at 409 (citing Gov’t Employee Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703–
04 (E.D. Va. 2004)). 
121 Id. at 409. 
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Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc.122  The Merck decision is significant not 
so much for the actual ruling but because it serves to illustrate the 
continuing confusion in the application of trademark law to keyword 
advertising.  For example, roughly one week before Merck was decided, a 
United States District Court in Minnesota came to a conclusion directly 
contrary to the Merck court.123   
 
[50] Merck addressed the issue of trademark infringement in keyword 
advertising involving Merck & Co., Inc’s blockbuster cholesterol drug 
Zocor.  Similar to the cases previously discussed, Merck brought suit 
against various Canadian online pharmacies for not only using the Zocor 
mark and logo (often identifying their products as “generic Zocor”) but 
also for purchasing “zocor” as a keyword advertisement from Google and 
Yahoo.124  Merck alleged claims of trademark infringement, trademark 
dilution, and false advertising.  The court held that Merck had stated a 
claim for trademark infringement as to most of the defendants based on 
their use of the marks on their websites.125  At the same time, the court 
rejected the claim that purchasing keywords constituted trademark 
infringement on the grounds that keyword purchases are not sufficient to 
qualify as a trademark “use.”126  While the court specifically adopted the 
1-800 Contacts analysis,127 it went on to acknowledge that the analysis 
was inconsistent with the holdings of the Google cases involving GEICO 
and American Blind.128  The court concluded by stating that keyword 
purchases alone are not an “independent basis for a trademark 
infringement claim.”129     
 
[51] Roughly one week before the Merck decision, the United States 
District Court for Minnesota came to a contrary conclusion in Edina 
                                                 
122 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
123 See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 
737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006). 
124 Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
125 Id. at 410–15. 
126 Id. at 415–16. 
127 Id. at 415. 
128 Id. at 415, n. 9. 
129 Id. at 416.  Note that the court also held that Merck’s allegations of trademark dilution 
were sufficient, however, to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Id. at 416–17. 
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Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com.130  While the Merck court relied on the 
simple reasoning that keyword purchases are invisible to consumers and 
therefore cannot constitute a trademark use “in commerce,”131 the Edina 
court ruled that the invisible nature of keyword purchases is irrelevant and 
that the purchasing of search terms is a use in commerce under the plain 
meaning of the Lanham Act.132  In coming to this conclusion, the Edina 
court relied in part on a 1999 decision by the United States Court of the 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which the appellate court found that 
Internet metatags were a use in commerce.133  It is especially important to 
note that the Edina decision serves as the first example of a U.S. court 
finding that buying competitors’ trademarks as keywords, standing alone, 
could constitute a trademark infringement.  At the same time, however, the 
Merck court, under similar facts, held that buying competitors’ trademarks 
as keywords does not constitute trademark infringement.  The conflicting 
rulings in Merck and Edina highlight the increasing confusion and 
discrepancy in keyword purchase case law.  If nothing else, these cases 
foreshadow the inevitable need for some sort of industry-wide regulation, 
congressional action, or judicial standard which may be applied uniformly 
to ease some of the confusion for advertisers, search engines, and 
consumers.   
 
2. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
 
[52] Only one thing is certain about the law in this area and that is that the 
law is uncertain.  The lack of appellate court decisions on this issue and 
the incomplete or competing analysis of the district courts who have 
addressed the matter make it difficult, though not impossible, to develop 
                                                 
130 Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 
737064, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006).  The Edina court held that “[b]ased on the plain 
meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms is a use in commerce.”  Id. at 
*3.  This case is also important because it appears to be the first case in which a 
purchaser’s liability for buying a competitor’s keyword is substantively analyzed.  Most 
other keyword advertising cases involve search engines as the defendants, not the actual 
keyword ad purchaser. 
131 See Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (stating that defendants’ invisible and internal 
electronic “use of the mark ‘Zocor’ as a key word to trigger the display of sponsored 
links is not use of the mark in a trademark sense.”). 
132 See Edina, 2006 WL 737064, at *3. 
133 Brookfield Comm’cns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
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an effective strategy for reducing the risk of trademark liability for 
keyword advertisers who purchase competing trademarks.134 
 
A) TRADEMARK USE 
 
[53] Certainly, search engines that use a party’s trademark to sell 
advertising and then link that advertising to search results created as a 
result of the use of the trademark in an internet search have reason for 
concern that their conduct may be considered a “use in commerce” of the 
trademark.135  Their concern should be shared equally by the advertisers 
who use another’s trademark as a source identifier in the advertising links 
posted on a search results page, though the potential exposure may be 
reduced or eliminated where the advertiser does not use the trademark as a 
source identifier and does not otherwise display the trademark on its 
website.136  Such caution may make it difficult for a potential plaintiff to 
demonstrate that consumers are likely to be confused by the juxtaposition 
of a link to the advertiser’s website, separate from the other links 
contained on the search results page, which does not, in any way, 
reference the subject trademark.  
 
B) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
 
[54] A keyword advertisement that actually uses another’s trademark (or a 
substantially similar mark) is certainly more likely to mislead consumers 
as to the source of goods or services137 than one that does not make any 
reference to the subject mark (or any substantially similar mark).  
However, the concept of initial interest confusion provides the trademark 
owner with some protection in these instances; the trademark owner’s best 
argument under these circumstances is that 
 
                                                 
134 Though, of course, avoiding the use of trademarks in keyword advertising would 
clearly be a safe strategy, it might significantly reduce the effectiveness of such 
advertisements. 
135 Id. at 407 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).  
136 Id. at 409. 
137 See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 43, at 565 (“[A] clear case of confusion exists if the 
competitor’s banner ad actually uses the trademark, or a similar mark or trade name to 
trick consumers into thinking that the trademark owner is the source or sponsor of the 
ad.”) 
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a consumer in search of its product or service would enter 
its trademark as a query and that the search engine would 
then generate a list of search results above which appears a 
[keyword advertisement].  The consumer would either 
become confused at that point and, thinking that the . . . ad 
was connected with the trademark owner or tempted by the 
. . . ad that the consumer assumes was triggered by the 
search term, click on the banner ad and be taken to the 
competitor’s website where the consumer would find and 
purchase a comparable product or service.138 
 
[55] A potential defendant, in responding to such an argument, would be 
well-served by noting that keyword advertising causes a banner 
advertisement or link to its website to be placed above, or to the side of, 
the actual search results generated. 139  Moreover, where a link to the 
advertiser’s website is produced, it is placed among a set of links 
designated as advertisements or “sponsored links.”  Thus, a sophisticated 
consumer would be unlikely to be misled as to the sponsorship or source 
of the advertised goods or services. 
 
C) PROBABILITY OF DILUTION 
 
[56] In the context of keyword advertising, it may be difficult to establish 
a claim for trademark dilution.  Where a keyword advertised is set apart 
from “ordinary” search results, a defendant may argue that consumers are 
unlikely to associate the advertisement with the trademarked search term, 
particularly if the advertisements makes no direct reference to the mark 
and clearly describes the source of the advertised goods or services.140  
Thus, neither theories of blurring nor tarnishment may be compelling. 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Id. at 565–66. 
139 Id. at 565 (discussing keyword banner advertisements).  Though, clearly the likelihood 
of confusion is greater for keyword advertising links (or “keyword featured placement 
advertising”) than for keyword banner advertising, since the advertising links are 
presented in a manner that more closely resembles the “ordinary” search results.  Id. at 
567. 
140 Id. at 571. 
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D) FAIR USE – COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING 
 
[57] According to at least one commentator, “[K]eyword . . . ads triggered 
by trademarks as search terms should be considered a privileged form of 
comparative advertising when they allow a firm to offer an alternate 
product or service in competition with that of a competitor.”141  This 
theory may, indeed, be accurate as long as the triggered advertisement is 
non-confusing and non-deceptive.142 
 
IV. LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO ONLINE SALES 
 
A. THE PROBLEM OF WORLDWIDE JURISDICTION 
 
[58] One of the primary advantages of Internet marketing and sales is the 
ability to reach potential customers anywhere in the world.  Unfortunately 
for the online retailer, this reach often works in both directions, so that a 
customer in a distant jurisdiction may be able to sue the retailer far from 
its base of operations.143  The defense of such a suit naturally begins with 
a challenge to personal jurisdiction by the online retailer. 
 
[59] According to relevant case law, 
  
the resolution of a challenge to in personam jurisdiction 
involves a two-step inquiry. . . . [First] a court must 
determine whether the particular facts and circumstances of 
the case fall within the reach of Virginia’s long-arm statute 
. . . .  Second, the court must determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be consistent with 
                                                 
141 Id. at 573. 
142 Id. (noting that such advertisements promote competition and, ultimately, benefit 
consumers). 
143 See, e.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(“‘the confluence of the “increasing nationalization of commerce” and “modern 
transportation and communication”’ carries with it a ‘resulting relaxation of the limits 
that the Due Process Clause imposes on courts’ jurisdiction.’”) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). 
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the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.144   
 
To survive the jurisdictional challenge, a plaintiff need only 
make a prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional 
basis on the basis of the complaint and supporting 
affidavits. . . . In considering a defendant’s challenge to 
personal jurisdiction, a court must construe all relevant 
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of 
jurisdiction.145   
 
1. APPLICATION OF THE VIRGINIA LONG-ARM STATUTE 
 
[60] The Virginia Long-Arm Statute states that, 
 
[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, 
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person’s . . . [c]ausing injury in this 
Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this 
Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or 
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or 
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed 
or services rendered in this Commonwealth . . . .146 
 
Analysis under this statute flows naturally into a consideration of the suit’s 
compliance with Due Process. 
 
                                                 
144 Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (citing Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party, Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 
477 (4th Cir. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1; Bochan v. LaFontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 
692, 697–98 (E.D. Va. 1999); DeSantis v. Hafner Creations, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 419, 422 
(E.D. Va. 1996)). 
145 Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing 
Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
146 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4) (2006).  Note also that the Virginia Code now 
specifically provides that “[u]sing a computer or computer network in the 
Commonwealth [of Virginia] shall constitute an act in the Commonwealth.”  VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-328.1(B) (2006).   
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2. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
 
[61] “The Due Process Clause requires that no defendant be haled into 
court unless he has ‘certain minimum contacts’ with the forum state such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”147   
 
[M]erely because a defendant is aware “that the stream of 
commerce may or will sweep the product  into the forum 
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product 
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the 
forum State.”148  Rather, the defendant must have 
“‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state’ . . . to ensure 
that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely 
as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ 
contacts.149   
 
[62] The determination of whether a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be undertaken through two 
different approaches:  (1) a consideration of specific jurisdiction, where 
jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum and is 
limited specifically and solely to those actions that are the basis of the suit; 
or (2) a consideration of general jurisdiction, where the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum are systematic and continuous such that the 
court’s jurisdiction over the defendant is not limited and need not arise out 
of the basis of the suit.150  In addressing the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose contact with the forum state occurs 
                                                 
147 Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945)). 
148 Id. at 349 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987)). 
149 Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). 
150 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711–12 (4th Cir. 
2002) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1984); Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 
259 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2001)).   
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primarily over the Internet, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and many 
other federal courts across the nation, have adopted and adapted the 
“sliding scale” approach formulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo 
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).151   
 
[63] In Zippo, the district court described a continuum of three categories 
of Internet jurisdiction cases, observing that, 
 
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the 
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet.  This sliding scale is consistent 
with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.  At 
one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant 
clearly does business over the Internet . . . .  At the opposite 
end are situations where a defendant has simply posted 
information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to 
users in foreign jurisdictions . . . .  The middle ground is 
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can 
exchange information with the host computer.152 
 
The district court concluded that jurisdiction certainly should be exercised 
when one proactively enters a jurisdiction via the Internet but that 
jurisdiction should not be exercised when one merely passively posts 
information on the Internet which may or may not be viewed by residents 
of a particular jurisdiction.  As to the great masses of cases resting in 
“middle ground,” the court held that “the exercise of jurisdiction is 
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature 
of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.”153  Thus, some 
sort of proactive, purposeful availment must occur on the part of the 
website owner in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction.154  Note, 
                                                 
151 ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 713–14; Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
152 Zippo Manuf. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
153 Id. 
154 See Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 
2003) (stating that when a nonresident defendant runs an interactive website, through 
which he enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the 
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, he can properly be 
hailed into the court of that foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the due process 
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however, that Virginia is considered a “single act” state, so even a single 
sale performed over the Internet may subject a party to personal 
jurisdiction in Virginia’s courts.155 
 
A) SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
 
[64] In considering the issue of specific jurisdiction, courts must consider 
 
(1) the extent to which the defendant “purposely avail[ed] 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; 
(2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those 
activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally 
“reasonable.”156 
 
                                                                                                                         
clause; however, if by contrast the defendant’s site is passive, in that it merely makes 
information available, the site cannot render him subject to specific personal jurisdiction 
since merely posting information on the Internet is not enough); Young v. New Haven 
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that posting information on a website 
accessible to readers in Virginia does not subject a party to personal jurisdiction in 
Virginia unless the Internet postings manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia 
readers); Rannoch, Inc. v. The Rannoch, Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(holding that merely placing information on a website is not enough to subject a party to 
a court’s jurisdiction, rather the defendant must have engaged in some purposeful 
availment of the jurisdiction).  But see Bochan v. LaFontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. 
Va. 1999) (stating that jurisdiction is proper where a defendant runs an interactive 
website that is accessible in Virginia 24 hours a day to promote and advertise its 
products, even though no sales are concluded through the site, because the site offers 
product information, company name and telephone numbers, offers no surcharge for 
credit card use, and places no geographical limits on purchasers).     
155 See Affinity Memory & Micro. v. K&Q Enters., 20 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(holding that a single act amounting to “transacting business” and giving rise to a cause 
of action may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1); 
United States v. Pierre Point Shipping & Inv. Co., 655 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Va. 1987) 
(stating that Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1 is a “single act” statute; and therefore 
jurisdiction will exist with respect to a cause of action arising from the business 
transaction if by that one act the nonresident can be said to have engaged in some 
purposeful activity in Virginia); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 377 S.E.2d 
388, 391 (Va. 1989) (“[Virginia’s long arm statute is a] single-act statute requiring only 
one transaction in Virginia to confer jurisdiction on our courts”).   
156 ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (citing Christian Science Bd., 259 F.3d at 216; 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n. 8). 
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[65] In ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied this general concept in the context of a 
nonresident defendant who entered the forum state over the Internet.  In 
that case, the court held, 
 
that a State may, consistent with due process, exercise 
judicial power over a person outside of the State when that 
person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with 
the manifested intent of engaging in business or other 
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in 
a person within the State, a potential cause of action 
cognizable in the State’s courts.157 
 
The Fourth Circuit further noted that this “standard for reconciling 
contacts through electronic media with standard due process principles”158 
is analogous to the “effects test” articulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Calder v. Jones159 in that “specific jurisdiction in the 
Internet context may be based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet 
activity directed at [the forum state] and causing injury that gives rise to a 
potential claim cognizable in [the forum state].”160 
 
B) GENERAL JURISDICTION 
 
[66] On the other hand, if the defendant’s contacts with the 
State are not also the basis for suit, then jurisdiction over 
the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general, 
more persistent, but unrelated contacts with the State.  To 
establish jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant’s 
activities in the State must have been “continuous and 
systematic,” a more demanding standard than is necessary 
for establishing specific jurisdiction.161 
 
                                                 
157 ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. 
158 Id. 
159 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
160 ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. 
161 Id. at 712 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n. 9). 
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Generally, the suits brought against online retailers and marketers will be 
directly related to their electronic contacts with the forum state and, 
therefore, the concept of general jurisdiction will rarely need to be 
considered.  For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that 
general jurisdiction based upon electronic contacts with the forum state 
will require much more significant and systematic contacts than would be 
required in a specific jurisdiction analysis. 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
 
[67] The potential for nationwide jurisdiction attendant to Internet sales is 
a very real threat to small online businesses who would not otherwise 
reach a customer base inconveniently distant from their place of business.  
An online company that wishes to limit this risk is best served by ensuring 
that it is not purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting 
business activities in an inconveniently distant jurisdiction through its 
website.  Such a company should not offer products or services directed 
to, or useable only by, customers in an inconveniently distant jurisdiction 
but should limit the geographic scope of its customer base via a well-
communicated policy of not filling orders for customers in distant 
jurisdictions; such a policy must be well-documented and should appear 
throughout the company’s website. 
 
A. DETERMINING THE TERMS OF THE DEAL 
 
1. GENERAL CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES 
 
[68] A contract is an agreement, supported by consideration, and arises 
when an offer is made by one party and that offer is accepted by 
another.162  According to Virginia case law, “Under the objective theory of 
contract, which controls in Virginia, an offer has been made if a 
reasonable person in the offeree’s position, in view of the offeror’s acts 
                                                 
162 See e.g., Richmond Eng. Corp. & Mfg. v. Loth, 115 S.E. 774, 782–86 (Va. 1923); 
Montagna v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 838 (Va. 1980); Chang v. First Colonial 
Savings Bank, 410 S.E.2d 928, 931 (Va. 1991). 
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and words and the surrounding circumstances, would believe that the 
offeror has invited the offeree’s acceptance.”163   
 
[69] Acceptance is defined as the “manifestation of assent164 to the terms 
of the offer made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the 
offer.”165  It is the “unconditional promise to be bound by the terms of the 
offer” and may be accomplished by conduct or words.166  According to 
standard definitions, “The modern test for determining whether there was 
acceptance (reflecting the objective theory of contact) is whether it would 
be clear to a reasonable person in the position of the offeror that there was 
an acceptance.”167 
 
[70] Consideration is defined as “that which is given in exchange for the 
agreement” and is “in effect, the price bargained for and paid for the 
agreement or promise.”168  Consideration may be the exchange of 
currency, property, or promises. 
 
2. ONLINE CONTRACTS 
 
A) TYPES OF ONLINE CONTRACTS 
 
(1) SHRINK-WRAP AGREEMENTS 
 
[71] Software is commonly packaged in a container or 
wrapper that advises the purchaser that the use of the 
software is subject to the terms of the license agreement 
contained inside the package.  The license agreement 
generally explains that, if the purchaser does not wish to 
enter into a contract, he must return the product for a 
                                                 
163 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 66 Va. Cir. 135, 154 (Portsmouth 2004) (citing Chang, 
410 S.E.2d at 931; Richmond Eng. Corp., 115 S.E. at 782–86). 
164 And, thus, mutual assent of the parties is required.  This is often referred to as a 
“meeting of the minds.”  Id. (citing Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427 S.E.2d 363, 
365 (Va. 1993)). 
165 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50; 17A AM. JUR. 2D, Contracts 
§ 66). 
166 Id. (citing Richmond Eng. Corp., 115 S.E. at 786). 
167 Id. (citing Green’s Ex’rs v. Smith, 131 S.E. 846, 848–49 (Va. 1926)). 
168 Id. (citing Montagna v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 838, 844 (Va. 1980)). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
 36
refund.  Failure to return the product within a certain period 
constitutes assent to the license terms.169 
 
License agreements of this sort are often referred to as shrink-wrap 
agreements because of the shrink-wrap packaging surrounding most retail 
software.  Such contracts are generally enforceable and courts have held 
that similar agreements “can bind users of a website, for instance, if notice 
is provided that continuing to explore a website or purchase of an item 
binds the party to an agreement located elsewhere on the website (for 
example, in the terms and conditions of use).”170 
 
(2) CLICK-WRAP AGREEMENTS 
 
[72] Often, the user of a commercial website is asked to read a set of terms 
and conditions governing the activities conducted on that site and then 
presented with two options:  (1) agreeing to the terms and conditions, or 
(2) refusing to agree to the terms and conditions.  Typically, the user must 
agree to the terms and conditions to make a purchase or obtain the service 
offered by the website.  Agreements entered into in this fashion are 
referred to as “click-wrap” agreements because the user typically indicates 
his or her agreement to the terms and conditions by clicking a button or 
hyperlink marked “I agree.”171  Generally, courts that have addressed the 
issue have found click-wrap agreements to be binding, subject to the 
traditional notions of fair dealing that make unconscionable agreements 
unenforceable172   
                                                 
169 JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING EBUSINESSES § 8-2.40, n. 2.50 (2006). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. (“For example, when a visitor to Netscape’s website desires to download certain 
software, a webpage appears containing the full text of the license agreement governing 
the download and use of that software.  Plainly visible on the screen is a question:  Do 
you accept all the terms of the preceding agreement?  If so, click on the Yes button.  If 
you select No, you will not be able to download the software.  Unless the user clicks 
‘Yes,’ indicating his consent to be bound by the agreement the user cannot download the 
software.”). 
172 Id. (citing Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); i-Systems, 
Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742082, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 29, 2004); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 
1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004); DeJohn v. TV Corp. Intl., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); 
Siedle v. National Ass’n. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (M.D. Fla. 2002); 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 
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(2) BROWSE-WRAP AGREEMENTS 
 
[73] In some instances, websites contain terms and conditions which 
purport to bind any user who visits the website without any other 
manifestation of assent by the visitor.   
 
Notice of the [terms and conditions] usually appears on 
the home page [but] . . . [t]he user is not required to click 
on an icon expressing agreement to the terms of the 
agreement (as is the case of click-wrap agreements), nor 
is the user ever required to view the terms (as in the case 
of shrink-wrap agreements).173   
 
Because such agreements lack an affirmative action indicating assent by 
the website visitor, many courts are reluctant to enforce them.174 
 
B) DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC  
TRANSACTIONS ACT 
 
[74] Virginia has enacted a set of laws dealing with electronic commerce 
called the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”).175  UETA does 
not change any substantive contract law, but rather provides procedural 
rules for conducting electronic transactions.176 
 
[75] UETA is designed to support the use of electronic media to conduct 
transactions between parties.177  The term commerce, as used in the 
UETA, is to be interpreted broadly, so that all sorts of transactions, 
                                                                                                                         
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Caspi v. Mcrosoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. App. Div. 
1999); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc, No. C-98JWPVTENE, 1998 WL 388389 
(N.D. Cal. 1998)); see also William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online 
Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 433, 434 (2004). 
173 JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING EBUSINESS § 8-2.40, n. 2.50  (2006).  
174 Id. at n. 11.50 (citing Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 
2000)).  Some jurisdictions, however, do enforce such agreements.  Id. at n. 11 (citing 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified, 
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
175 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-479 to 59.1-497 (2006).   
176 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-479, cmt. A (2006). 
177 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480, cmt. 12 (2006).   
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executed electronically, may fall under the purview of this code section.178  
The gravitas of UETA is found in Virginia Code § 59.1-485, which 
provides that:   
 
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or 
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; (b) a 
contract cannot be denied legal effect or enforceability 
solely because it was formed using electronic means . . . (c) 
an electronic writing satisfies the statute of frauds, or any 
other law requiring a writing; and (d) an electronic 
signature satisfies [any] law requiring a signature.179 
 
[76] UETA defines “electronic record” as “a record created, generated, 
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”180    UETA 
defines “electronic signature” as an “electronic sound, symbol, or process 
associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the 
intent to sign the record.”181  This definition includes the “standard 
webpage click through process. . . . When a person orders goods online, 
gets to the last step and clicks on ‘I agree,’ that person has adopted the 
process and has done so with the apparent intent of receiving goods, 
thereby being bound to pay for them.”182 By clicking on “I agree,” the 
person has provided an electronic signature assenting to the transaction, 
per the terms of this statute.183 
 
[77] Many other states have enacted legislation either identical, or 
substantially similar, to UETA in their respective jurisdictions.184  The 
                                                 
178 Id.   
179 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-485(a)–(d) (2006). 
180 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(7) (2006). 
181 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(8) (2006).   
182 Id. at cmt. 7.      
183 Id. 
184 See ALA. CODE §§ 8-1A-1 to 8-1A-20 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-32-101 to 25-32-
121 (2002); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1 to 1633.17 (WEST 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.6, §§ 
12A-101 to 12A-117 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 668.50 (2005); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 489E-1 
to 489E-19 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-50-101 to 28-50-120 (2005); IND. CODE §§ 
26-2-8-101 to 26-2-8-302 (2005); IOWA CODE §§ 554D.101 to 554D.123 (2005); 
KENTUCKY REVISED STAT. ANN. §§ 369.101 to 369.120 (2002); MAINE REV. STAT ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 9401 to 9419 (2005); MD. CODE ANN. COM LAW  §§ 21-101 to 21-120 (WEST 
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS. §§ 450-831 to 450.849 (2002); MINN. STAT. §§ 325L.01 to 
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impact of this code section on internet click through agreements is 
noteworthy.  For example, let us assume that a consumer visits a web site 
and purchases $600.00 worth of sporting goods by entering all of his 
pertinent information into an electronic order form and clicking on “I 
Agree” at the end of the transaction.  Under traditional contract law, this 
type of contract must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, 
as it is a sale of goods exceeding $500.00.185  With the advent of UETA, 
this electronic transaction satisfies the statute of frauds, as the electronic 
order form would constitute a writing under UETA and the person would 
have signed the agreement by clicking on the “I Agree” icon.186 
 
C) DOCUMENTATION 
 
[78] The World Wide Web is a fluid medium.  Commercial websites 
change frequently, sometimes even on a weekly or daily basis, as new 
products and services are offered and new terms and conditions are 
applied to sales.  The online contract that applies to a sale on a company’s 
website today may not have the same terms as the online contract that 
applied last month or last year. 
 
[79] A company that does not properly document and retain its website 
content as it changes over time runs the substantial risk of being unable to 
prove the precise contractual terms applicable to a specific transaction.  
Such a company may be unable to prove a claim for non-payment and 
may be unable to fully defend a suit brought by a customer.  In particular, 
online contracts by which a customer agrees to bring claims in an agreed 
upon forum, provide warranty terms or conditions of sale, or limit the 
online retailer’s liability in scope or amount of damages provide vital 
protections to the online business.  Without the ability to establish the 
                                                                                                                         
325L.19 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-12-1 to 75-12-39 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
30-18-101 to 30-18-118 (2005); NEB. REV. ST. §§ 86-612 to 86-643 (2005); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 294-E:1 to 294-E:20(WEST 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:12-1 to 
12A:12-25 (WEST 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to 66-330 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE. 
ANN. §§ 1306.01 to 1306.23 (2002); OKL. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 15-101 to 15-120 (2002); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 42-127.1-1 to 42-107.1-20 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 
43.001 to 43.021 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to 46-4-503 (2005); W. VA. CODE 
§§ 39A-1-1 to 39A-1-17 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-21-101 to 40-21-119 (2005). 
185 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-201 (2001).   
186 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(7)–(8) (2001). 
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exact terms of a specific transaction, sometimes years later, the online 
business runs a risk of catastrophic loss.187 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
[80] The Internet provides many new sales and marketing opportunities, 
though these new opportunities are coupled with significant risks.  Online 
businesses must adapt to this changing commercial environment.  Just as 
the online medium has changed the sales and marketing techniques of 
these online retailers, it must also alter the legal strategy and advice of 
their counsel.  Failure to adapt in this way will reduce the efficiency of the 
Internet as a commercial medium or, worse still, lead to the demise of an 
unwary business.188 
                                                 
187 A company runs a similar risk of catastrophic loss where it fails to properly document 
and retain the changing content of its copyrighted website text and images.  As the United 
States Copyright Office has recognized, “[m]any works transmitted online are revised or 
updated frequently.”  U.S. Copyright Office Circular 66.  Federal copyright registration 
of an online work, such as a commercial website, requires the owner to be able to identify 
the precise content to be protected.  Similarly, the enforcement of an owner’s rights in a 
copyrighted work, whether it is federally registered or not, requires the owner to be able 
to establish the precise content owned.  Without a method of regularly documenting and 
retaining website content, an online business risks being unable to document or enforce 
its rights in a copyrighted work. 
188Any information contained herein is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on 
any subject matter.  No recipients of these materials should act or refrain from acting on 
the basis of any information contained herein without seeking appropriate legal advice. 
